NINOMANIA
:: A constitutional law blog by Scalia/Thomas fan David M. Wagner, M.A., J.D., Research Fellow, National Legal Foundation, and Teacher, Veritas Preparatory Academy. Opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect those of the NLF or Veritas. :: bloghome | E-mail me ::
:: Tuesday, March 01, 2005 ::
Juvenile Death Penalty Banned by U.S. Supreme Court
March 1 (Bloomberg) -- A divided U.S. Supreme Court outlawed executions of murderers who were under 18 at the time of the crime, saying the practice violates the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Here is the slip opinion. Justice Scalia's dissent is here.
You know, state governments -- notoriously pinched for funds -- could save a bundle by disbanding their legislatures and just letting the Supreme Court rule them directly through its by-now-familiar process of consensus-discernment. The only downside would be that the views of "international" (read: European; certainly not African or Asian) jurists would frequently be enacted into American constitutional law, as they have been today.
I don't even particularly like the death penalty. The preaching of Pope John Paul II has given me a lot that I need to think about here. But the formulation of a moral judgment on it, and the translation of that judgment into votes every election year, is something I can handle myself, and I think most of my fellow-citizens can too. When did I resign that authority to litigators and courts? When did we vote on that? Oh, I forgot: resolving major issues by voting is so two hundred years ago.
And another thing I forgot: morality can't be the basis for legislating any more. Only for judging, it seems.
To get you started on the dissent:In urging approval of a constitution that gave life-tenured judges the power to nullify laws enacted by the people's representatives, Alexander Hamilton assured the citizens of New York that there was little risk in this, since "[t]he judiciary...ha[s] neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment." The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed, 1961). But Hamilton had in mind a traditional judiciary, "bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them." Id., at 471. Bound down, indeed. What a mockery today's opinion makes of Hamilton's expectation, announcing the Court's conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years -- not, mind you, that this Court's decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has changed.....Worse still, the Court says in so many words that what our people's laws say about the issue does not, in the last analysis, matter....
:: David M. Wagner 2:41 PM [+] ::
...
March 1 (Bloomberg) -- A divided U.S. Supreme Court outlawed executions of murderers who were under 18 at the time of the crime, saying the practice violates the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.Here is the slip opinion. Justice Scalia's dissent is here.
You know, state governments -- notoriously pinched for funds -- could save a bundle by disbanding their legislatures and just letting the Supreme Court rule them directly through its by-now-familiar process of consensus-discernment. The only downside would be that the views of "international" (read: European; certainly not African or Asian) jurists would frequently be enacted into American constitutional law, as they have been today.
I don't even particularly like the death penalty. The preaching of Pope John Paul II has given me a lot that I need to think about here. But the formulation of a moral judgment on it, and the translation of that judgment into votes every election year, is something I can handle myself, and I think most of my fellow-citizens can too. When did I resign that authority to litigators and courts? When did we vote on that? Oh, I forgot: resolving major issues by voting is so two hundred years ago.
And another thing I forgot: morality can't be the basis for legislating any more. Only for judging, it seems.
To get you started on the dissent:
In urging approval of a constitution that gave life-tenured judges the power to nullify laws enacted by the people's representatives, Alexander Hamilton assured the citizens of New York that there was little risk in this, since "[t]he judiciary...ha[s] neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment." The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed, 1961). But Hamilton had in mind a traditional judiciary, "bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them." Id., at 471. Bound down, indeed. What a mockery today's opinion makes of Hamilton's expectation, announcing the Court's conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years -- not, mind you, that this Court's decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has changed.....Worse still, the Court says in so many words that what our people's laws say about the issue does not, in the last analysis, matter....
:: David M. Wagner 2:41 PM [+] ::
...
