Keep your "Yankee From Olympus" -- Give me Sancho Panza from New Jersey!
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:: Friday, July 01, 2005 ::
Sen. Arlen Specter, the Republican head of the Senate Judiciary Committee that will take up the nomination, said he would hold hearings in August if necessary. "The judiciary committee is prepared to proceed at any time," he said.
:: David M. Wagner 8:19 PM [+] ::
Meanwhile, The Washington Post says:
The White House said later no announcement will be made until the president returns from the G8 summit in Scotland. He is scheduled to return on July 8.Now, me, I can't see any reason to name a successor any time before Labor Day. That's long enough before the first Monday in October to give the Senate time to do a serious and proper advice-and-consent job, the more so since both "sides" already have thick files on all possible nominees. What a Labor Day announcement does not leave time for is a concentrated, professional, grass-roots campaign against one particular nominee. And the White House shouldn't leave time for that.
If a nomination is announced earlier, it should only be because either or both of two conditions prevails:
* Sen. Specter has promised to hold hearings during the summer, rather than waiting until September, and there are political hostages to make sure he keeps that promise;
* Activist groups supporting the President's nominee are organized and ready to go this time, in a way they weren't in 1987.
:: David M. Wagner 1:03 PM [+] ::
:: David M. Wagner 11:38 AM [+] ::
Caution -- snark-infested waters! Some fun reads today!
Btw, here is the entirety of O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Van Orden: "For essentially the reasons given by Justice Souter, post, p.___ (dissenting opinion), as well as the reasons given in my concurrence in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., post, at ___, I respectfully dissent." A tree died for that?
:: David M. Wagner 12:34 PM [+] ::
:: David M. Wagner 12:27 PM [+] ::
Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the second decision on a religious display, finding no constitutional violation in the placement of a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building in Austin, Texas. That decision was widely splintered. Announcing the votes of the various Justices, Rehnquist quipped -- to widespread laughter -- that he did not know there were so many Justices on the Court.
:: David M. Wagner 11:03 AM [+] ::
1. O'Connor was the swing vote in McCreary, and she likes to do the Grutter/Gratz two-step.
2. She may particularly wish to do one here if she perceives, as I think is the case, that if the secularists sweep a double-header today, it will be too deep a draw-down on the Court's public credibility. Otoh, if such a double sweep does occur, it might be an advantage for Republicans in a (still-hypothetical) confirmation battle this summer or (more likely) fall.
:: David M. Wagner 10:56 AM [+] ::
UPDATE: From CNN --
That would be the McCreary case. Van Orden is still to come as of this writing.
:: David M. Wagner 10:18 AM [+] ::
Our local paper gets it: in its print edition this morning (not online), the Virginian-Pilot's headline ran: "City Has Plans For Your Home: Start Packing!"
Say, you don't suppose Kelo is the Supreme Court's response to the "housing bubble," by any chance? You know -- put the guvmint a check away from owning anyone's house, and housing values just have to go down, don't they?
But that's not all: the lower home values go, the more tempting the use of eminent domain will become. Soon every square foot of the country that isn't a national park or a wetland will be occupied, not by socially wasteful private homes, but by job-creating, revenue enhancing businesses!
But wait -- the people who get those jobs -- where will they live? Not a problem: Walmart, Pfizer, et al. will put up tall, efficient apartment blocs right next to their workplaces. Or right above them, so that workers can elevator-commute and not pollute! Solves trafffic problems too, see?
Eventually the whole nation will look like East Germany in the '60s, except it will be a business-goverment alliance, rather than a means-of-production-owning state, that will be in charge.
Those Framers, with their 18th century notions of property rights -- what were they thinking?
:: David M. Wagner 12:47 PM [+] ::
That's quite a performance in the principal dissent in this morning's disastrous Kelo decision! Justice O'Connor is not known for staking out broad philosophical ground, and neither Justice Scalia nor the Chief is known for invoking natural law. Yet the dissent written by O'C and joined by the others and Thomas opens with nothing less than Justice Chase's hymn to natural-law judging from Calder v. Bull!
Here it is, as cited by O'C:
“An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority … . A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean… . [A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.” Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis deleted).Now, to be sure, O'C cushions this quotation so as to make it sound as though Chase were construing the Bill of Rights. She does this be prefacing the quotation with:
Over two centuries ago, just after the Bill of Rights was ratified, Justice Chase wrote....But fans of Major League Natural Law-ball will see past this veil that O'C modestly draws over her reversion to First Principles.
With humility very rare in any high governmnent officeholder, she acknowledges "errant language" in an opinion she herself wrote, namely Midkiff, which the majority relies on and extends:
There is a sense in which this troubling result follows from errant language in Berman and Midkiff. In discussing whether takings within a blighted neighborhood were for a public use, Berman began by observing: “We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police power.” 348 U.S., at 32. From there it declared that “[o]nce the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.” Id., at 33. Following up, we said in Midkiff that “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” 467 U.S., at 240. This language was unnecessary to the specific holdings of those decisions....It's so good to read an O'Connor dissent that gets a little hot under the collar. So often, whether for the Court or concurring or dissenting, she's in a "Now you boys quit fighting and settle down" kind of mode. Today she's throwing punches.
[W]ere the political branches the sole arbiters of the public-private distinction, the Public Use Clause would amount to little more than hortatory fluff.Now, does today's decision follow from Midkiff and its predecessors? Certainly I had thought that Midkiff virtually turns the Takings Clause's public use requirement into nothing more than a pleading formality, and that fidelity to the Takings Clause would require that Midkiff be overruled. Justice Thomas calls in that direction, as we will see. But the principal dissent, which Thomas has also signed, insists there was a meaningful judicial role even after Midkiff, until today:
The Court’s holdings in Berman and Midkiff were true to the principle underlying the Public Use Clause. In both those cases, the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society–in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty and in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth. And in both cases, the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use was necessary to remedy the harm. Berman, supra, at 28—29; Midkiff, supra, at 232. Thus a public purpose was realized when the harmful use was eliminated. Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the property was turned over to private use....Brava!
Justice Thomas contributes an additional dissent, being once again the prophetic voice of original meaning, and, ahem, it sure would have been nice if Justice Scalia could have seen his way clear to joining this one, since it's so much in the spirit of his opinion for the Court in Nollan v. Coastal Commission and his partial concurrence/partial dissent in Pennell v. San Jose. Anyway.
After a tour of founding-era dictionaries and early takings jurisprudence, Thomas then rubs the majority's nose in the Peckhamite origins of its theory:
As the Court notes, the “public purpose” interpretation of the Public Use Clause stems from Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161—162 (1896). Ante, at 11. The issue in Bradley was whether a condemnation for purposes of constructing an irrigation ditch was for a public use. 164 U.S., at 161. This was a public use, Justice Peckham declared for the Court, because “[t]o irrigate and thus to bring into possible cultivation these large masses of otherwise worthless lands would seem to be a public purpose and a matter of public interest, not confined to landowners, or even to any one section of the State.” Ibid. That broad statement was dictum, for the law under review also provided that “[a]ll landowners in the district have the right to a proportionate share of the water.” Id., at 162.And so on. Peckham, Peckham, Peckham! Yes, the Court is relying on a constitutional turn taken while the author of Lochner was driving, but the Court can't bring itself to say so, so Justice Thomas will, frequently.
As he occasionally does, Thomas makes himself the spokesman for the likely effects of the Court's decision on African-Americans, effects that of course are the opposite of what the liberal authors of those effects publicly intend:
Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful. If ever there were justification for intrusive judicial review of constitutional provisions that protect “discrete and insular minorities,” United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938), surely that principle would apply with great force to the powerless groups and individuals the Public Use Clause protects....
A bad day for ordered liberty, but a good day for dissents, and that's about all I've learned to hope for from this Court.
One reads a lot about this terrible "conservative activist" Court that we have. If the Court was "conservative" even for a brief interval, that era stopped when Justice Ginsburg replaced Justice White. As Kelo and Raich show, to say nothing of the abortion cases since Hodgson, the Court has working liberal majority. The only exception has been the substantial relaxation, throughout the '90s and early '00s so far, of the Court's extermination campaign against religion in the public square. And I'm betting that trend will be reversed next week when we find out that Establishment Clause bans public placement of the Ten Commandments.
:: David M. Wagner 8:33 PM [+] ::
:: David M. Wagner 11:24 AM [+] ::
Many thanks to the many who discussed my "Bad dream" post about Raich yesterday, e.g. Howard Bashman, Peter Sean of Lex Communis (also here), Eve Tushnet, and Marty Lederman, writing at Scotusblog.
Am I going to give this blog a new name? Marty suggested "Clarencemania." Hmm. How about "Better than Toast"? (Does anyone remember that Thomas's English Muffins ad campaign from about 20 years ago -- "Thomas's is better than toast"?) And you'll notice that there is, and always has been, a link in my margin to the Justice Thomas Appreciation Page.
But no -- no changes here. On issues concerning the scope of federal power, Scalia has in general been a consistent New Deal Justice, full of the Spirit of '37. His critique of Humphrey's Executor in his Morrison v. Olson dissent blasted H.E. as "considered at the time the product of an activist, anti-New Deal court," and nothing in that dissent suggests that he does not share that view. (To be sure, Humphrey's Executor can never be sufficiently condemned, but I'm not sure I, personally, would have listed its anti-New Deal nature as one of its vices. In fact, I don't think H.E. is "anti-New Deal" at all, though it was anti-FDR -- but I digress.)
Scalia's Raich concurrence is also unsurprising in light of his opinion for the Court in Whitman v. American Trucking. When I published a little reflection on that case myself -- 11 Baltimore J.Env.L. 25 (2003) -- I confined myself to its positive aspect, namely, its two-fisted rejection of the Sunsteinian "new non-delegation doctrine," under which the non-delegation doctrine leaves Congress free to delegate as much as it likes, while the agencies police their own use of those powers, and the courts police the agencies' self-policing.
But American Trucking also has what I might call a "dark side," namely, its uncritical reliance on New Deal-era delegation decisions that find that phrases such as "in the public interest" give agencies sufficient guidance so that we cannot say that lawmaking has been delegated. Uh huh, and blackbirds can fly to Jupiter.
My point here is, if those 1940s delegate-your-buns-off cases are good law, there's no reason by Wickard isn't too. Except -- they shouldn't be, and it shouldn't.
For further clarification on why I remain a Ninomaniac, come to SEAALS this year and listen to my paper on "Justice Scalia and the Jurisprudence of Tradition."
:: David M. Wagner 2:04 PM [+] ::
Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II—A—1, and II—B—2, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts II—A—2, II—B—1, II—B—3, and III—B, in which Stevens and Souter, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III—A, in which Stevens, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, J., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined with respect to Part I—A.And a good time was had by all.
:: David M. Wagner 10:46 PM [+] ::
This is an organization that deserves to be better known. It is not just for law profs, and I benefited from interacting on pro-life issues with philosophers, nursing teachers, literary scholars, communications profs, and at least one Straussian!
:: David M. Wagner 4:04 PM [+] ::
Dissents are provided by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, with the Chief and Thomas concurring in most of O'Connor's dissent.
This is the much-discussed "medical marijuana" case, but I am one of those who have seen it along as primarily a Commerce Clause case, posing not the question, is medical marijuana a good idea, but the question, will the Court's recent rediscovery of judicially enforceable limits on Congress's Commerce Clause powers continue, or be halted? The answer: halted, with a Scalia concurrence.
Keep in mind that the case deals with the federal Controlled Substances Act as applied not only to economic transactions, but also to acts that the Court and Justice Scalia admit are non-economic, such as personal possession of marijuana, analogously to the possession of firearms in Lopez.
So, what does Our Hero have to say for himself?
As we implicitly acknowledged in Lopez, however, Congress’s authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws directed against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Though the conduct in Lopez was not economic, the Court nevertheless recognized that it could be regulated as “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” 514 U.S., at 561. This statement referred to those cases permitting the regulation of intrastate activities “which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.” Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S., at 119; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118—119 (1941); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S., at 353. As the Court put it in Wrightwood Dairy, where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, “it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.” 315 U.S., at 118—119.Now, it's one thing to accept the Shreveport Rates doctrine that a proper federal regulatory scheme may reach intrastate economic activity, but another, imho, to accept supinely the New Deal add-on to Shreveport, as Our Hero does:
As the Court said in the Shreveport Rate Cases, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not give “Congress … the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a State, as such,” but it does allow Congress “to take all measures necessary or appropriate to” the effective regulation of the interstate market, “although intrastate transactions … may thereby be controlled.” 234 U.S., at 353; see also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S., at 38 (the logic of the Shreveport Rate Cases is not limited to instrumentalities of commerce).O.H. then addresses the dissenters:
Today’s principal dissent objects that, by permitting Congress to regulate activities necessary to effective interstate regulation, the Court reduces Lopez and Morrison to “little more than a drafting guide.” Post, at 5 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). I think that criticism unjustified. Unlike the power to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation effective. As Lopez itself states, and the Court affirms today, Congress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to do so “could … undercut” its regulation of interstate commerce. See Lopez, supra, at 561; ante, at 15, 21, 22. This is not a power that threatens to obliterate the line between “what is truly national and what is truly local.” Lopez, supra, at 567—568.If there's anything I like less than Justice Scalia being wrong, it's Justice O'Connor being right. But imo her response to the foregoing is spot-on:
Until today, such arguments have been made only in dissent. See Morrison, 529 U.S., at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (given that Congress can regulate “ ‘an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,’ ” “can Congress save the present law by including it, or much of it, in a broader ‘Safe Transport’ or ‘Worker Safety’ act?”). Lopez and Morrison did not indicate that the constitutionality of federal regulation depends on superficial and formalistic distinctions. Likewise I did not understand our discussion of the role of courts in enforcing outer limits of the Commerce Clause for the sake of maintaining the federalist balance our Constitution requires, see Lopez, 514 U.S., at 557; id., at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring), as a signal to Congress to enact legislation that is more extensive and more intrusive into the domain of state power. If the Court always defers to Congress as it does today, little may be left to the notion of enumeratedI could do without the scornful references to "superficial and formalistic distinctions." Law as such is full of those, and Justice O'Connor's tendency to belittle them is not her most endearing habit. But today she's right.
Justice Thomas, for his part, reiterates the prophetic view from his concurrence in Lopez, that a clear commerce/manufacture distinction is key to the original meaning of the Commerce Clause, as the Court held in 1895 in E.C. Knight:
The Clause’s text, structure, and history all indicate that, at the time of the founding, the term “ ‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.” Id., at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring). Commerce, or trade, stood in contrast to productive activities like manufacturing and agriculture. Id., at 586—587 (Thomas, J., concurring). Throughout founding-era dictionaries, Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention, The Federalist Papers, and the ratification debates, the term “commerce” is consistently used to mean trade or exchange–not all economic or gainful activity that has some attenuated connection to trade or exchange. Ibid. (Thomas, J., concurring).
:: David M. Wagner 1:37 PM [+] ::